2015年10月10日雅思阅读真题回忆-智课教育出国考试(2)

B Wimmer and Pemer devised a 'false belief task5 to addressthis question. They used some toys to act out the following story.

Maxi left some chocolate in a blue cupboard before he went out.When he was away his mother moved the chocolate to a greencupboard. Children were asked to predict where Maxi will lookfor his chocolate when he returns. Most children under four yearsgave the incorrect answer，that Maxi will look in the greencupboard. Those over four years tended to give the correctanswer, that Maxi will look in the blue cupboard. The incorrectanswers indicated that the younger children did not understandthat Maxi’s beliefs and representations no longer matched theactual state of the world, and they failed to appreciate that Maxiwill act on the basis of his beliefs rather than the way that theworld is actually organised.

C A simpler version of the Maxi task was devised by

Baron-Cohen to take account of criticisms that younger childrenmay have been affected by the complexity and too muchinformation of the story in the task described above. For

example, the child is shown two dolls， Sally and Anne, who havea basket and a box，respectively. Sally also has a marble，whichshe places in her basket，and then leaves to take a walk. Whileshe is out of the room，Anne takes the marble from the basket,eventually putting it in the box. Sally returns, and the child isthen asked where Sally will look for the marble. The child passesthe task if she answers that Sally will look in the basket，whereshe put the marble; the child fails the task if she answers thatSally will look in the box，where the child knows the marble ishidden，even though Sally cannot know, since she did not see ithidden there. In order to pass the task，the child must be able tounderstand that another’s mental representation of the

situation is different from their own，and the child must be ableto predict behavior based on that understanding. The results ofresearch using false-belief tasks have been fairly consistent: mostnormally-developing children are unable to pass the tasks until

around age four.

D Leslie argues that，before 18 months，children treat theworld in a literal way and rarely demonstrate pretence. He alsoargues that it is necessary for the cognitive system to distinguishbetween what is pretend and what is real. If children were notable to do this, they would not be able to distinguish betweenimagination and reality. Leslie suggested that this pretend playbecomes possible because of the presence of a de-coupler thatcopies primary representations to secondary representations. Forexample, children，when pretending a banana is a telephone,would make a secondary representation of a banana. They wouldmanipulate this representation and they would use their storedknowledge of 'telephone5 to build on this pretence.

E There is also evidence that social processes play a part inthe development of TOM. Meins and her colleagues have foundthat what they term mindmindedness in maternal speech tosix-month old infants is related to both security of attachmentand to TOM abilities. Mindmindedness involves speech that

discusses infants5 feelings and explains their behaviour in termsof mental states (e. g. < you’re feeling hungry’).

F Lewis investigated older children living in extended familiesin Crete and Cyprus. They found that children who sociallyinteract with more adults，who have more friends，and whohave more older siblings tend to pass TOM tasks at a slightlyearlier age than other children. Furthermore, because young

children are more likely to talk about their thoughts and feelingswith peers than with their mothers，peer interaction mayprovide a special impetus to the development of a TOM. Asimilar point has been made by Dunn, who argues that peerinteraction is more likely to contain pretend play and that it islikely to be more challenging because other children，unlikeadults，do not make large adaptations to the communicative

needs of other children.

G In addition，there has been concern that some aspects ofthe TOM approach underestimate children's understanding ofother people. After all，infants will point to objects apparently inan effort to change a person's direction of gaze and interest; theycan interact quite effectively with other people; they will expresstheir ideas in opposition to the wishes of others; and they willshow empathy for the feelings of others. All this suggests thatthey have some level of understanding that their own thoughtsare different to those in another person’s mind. Evidence tosupport this position comes from a variety of sources. When acard with a different picture on each side is shown to a child andan adult sitting opposite her，then three year olds understandthat they see a different picture to that seen by the adult.

H Schatz studied the spontaneous speech of three-year-oldsand found that these children used mental terms，and usedthem in circumstances where there was a contrast between, forexample, not being sure where an object was located and findingit，or between pretending and reality. Thus the social abilities ofchildren indicate that they are aware of the difference betweenmental states and external reality at ages younger than four.

I A different explanation has been put forward by Harris. Heproposed that children use 'simulation‘. This involves puttingyourself in the other person's position，and then trying topredict what the other person would do. Thus success on falsebelief tasks can be explained by children trying to imagine whatthey would do if they were a character in the stories，rather thanchildren being able to appreciate the beliefs of other people.Such thinking about situations that do not exist involves what istermed counterfactual reasoning.

参考答案：

Questions 27-33 Matching

A Baron-Cohen

B Meins

C Wimmer and Pemer

D Lewis

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