Does Going Public Affect Innovation(6)

(4)Irestricttheanalysistoinventorsthatgeneratepost-?lingpatentsinasample?rm,andasadependentvariableIuseanindicatorforwhetheraninventorisanewcomer.Usingthe2SLSspeci?cationI?ndthatIPO?rmsaresubstantiallymorelikelytohirenewinventors.Themagnitudeofthecoe?cientislarge,correspondingtoa38.8%increase.25

Theresultsrevealthatthetransitiontopublicequitymarketshasimportantimplications

Accepted Articleforthehumancapitalaccumulationprocess,asitshapes?rms’abilitytoretainandattractinventors.FollowingtheIPO,thereisanexodusofinventorsleavingthe?rm,andmorespin-o?saregeneratedfollowingtheirdeparture.Additionally,goingpublica?ectsthepro-ductivityoftheinventorswhoremainatthe?rm.TheaveragequalityofpatentsproducedbystayersdeclinessubstantiallyatIPO?rms.However,thise?ectismitigatedinpartbytheabilityofIPO?rmstoattractnewinventorswhoproducepatentsofhigherqualitythantheinventorswhoremainatthe?rm.

C.AcquisitionofExternalTechnologies

Inthissection,Iexplorehowthetransitiontopublicequitymarketsa?ects?rms’reliance

onexternaltechnologiespurchasedthroughmergersandacquisitions.26Icollectinformation

onallacquisitionsconductedbyIPOandwithdrawn?rmsusingtheSDCdatabase.27In

resultsreportedintheInternetAppendix,I?ndthatIPO?rmsexhibitasharpincreaseinM&Aactivityinthe?veyearsfollowingtheIPO,whilethereisnomeaningfule?ectforwithdrawn?rms.

Acquisitions,however,areusedforavarietyofreasons.Thequestionremainswhether

acquisitionsareusedtobuyexternaltechnologies.Icollectinformationonpatentsgeneratedbytarget?rmsintheyearspriortotheacquisitionbymatchingacquisitiontargetstotheNBERpatentsdatabase.28Approximately7,500patentswereacquiredthroughmergersandacquisitionsinthe?veyearsfollowingtheIPO?ling,relativetoapproximately30,000patentsproduced.IntheInternetAppendix,IshowthatbeforetheIPO?lingbothwithdrawnandIPO?rmsrarelyacquireexternalpatentsthroughM&A.FollowingtheIPO,however,the

25

This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

fractionofexternalpatentsinIPO?rms’portfolioincreasesto31%whileitremainssmallforwithdrawn?rms(8%).

Similarpatternsarisewhenusingtheinstrumentalvariablesapproach.InTableX,the

Accepted Articledependentvariableisthenumberofexternalpatentsboughtthroughmergersandacquisi-tionsinthe?veyearsfollowingtheIPO?ling.Allspeci?cationsfollowthemodeldescribedinSectionII.A,controllingfor?lingyearandindustry?xede?ects.Ialsoaddalladditionalcontrolvariablespreviouslymentioned.Iestimatethe2SLSincolumn(3)and?ndthatIPO?rmsacquire2.6morepatentsperyearcomparedtowithdrawn?rms.[INSERTTABLEX]

Theidentifyingassumptionhereisthat,fortwo?rmsthatattempttogopublicinthe

sameyear,changesinshort-termNASDAQ?uctuationshaveasimilare?ectonthelikelihoodofacquiringexternalpatents.Tofurtheralleviateconcernsabouttheexclusionrestriction,incolumn(4)Ialsocontrolfortheindustryacquisitionintensityinthe?veyearsfollowingtheIPO?ling.29I?ndthattheresultscontinuetohold.IntheInternetAppendix,theseresultscanbealsoillustratedbycomparingsimpleaveragesbetween?rmsthatexperienceaNASDAQdropandother?lersinthesameyear,similartotheapproachtakeninTableV.Giventheincreasedrelianceonexternalpatents,itisinterestingtocomparetheexternal

andinternalpatentsofIPO?rms.IntheInternetAppendix,I?ndthatonaverageexternalpatentsexhibithigherqualitythanpatentsgeneratedinternally,asmeasuredbyaveragescaledcitations.30Overall,theresultssuggestthatgoingpublicleadstoenhancedreliance

onexternaltechnologies.

IV.PotentialChannels

Theempirical?ndingsthusfarillustratethatthetransitiontopublicequitymarkets

changes?rm’sinnovationstrategy.FollowingtheIPO,?rmsexperienceadeclineininno-vationquality,substantialinventorturnover,andanincreaseintheacquisitionofexternal

26

This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

innovation.

Inthissection,Idiscussseveralpotentialexplanationsforthe?ndings.FollowingtheIPO,various?rmcharacteristicschange,andhenceanumberofpotentialstoriesmayarise.Ifocusonfoursuchexplanations.Thecorporate?nanceliteraturehaslongarguedthatpublicownershipentailsagencyproblemsbetweenmanagersandshareholdersduetotheseparationofownershipandcontrol(BerleandMeans(1932),JensenandMeckling(1976)).Therefore,I?rstfocusontwohypothesesbasedonagencyproblemsthatcanleadpubliclytraded?rmstoconducttoolittleinnovation.Speci?cally,motivatedbyAghion,VanReenen,andZingales(2013),Ifocusonthemanagerialcareerconcernsandthequietlifehypotheses.However,itmaybethecasethatagencyproblemsaremorepervasiveinprivate?rms,leadingtotoomuchinnovation.Thisalternativetheoryiscapturedbytheexcessiveinnovationhypothesis.Finally,Iconsiderthecaseinwhichtheresultsmaynotbedrivenbyagencyproblems.Inparticular,thisagency-freehypothesisismotivatedbytheassumptionthatcommercializationiscapital-intensiveandthuspossibleonlyfollowingtheIPO.

Idiscussthesehypothesesindetailbelow,andthenprovidesuggestiveempiricalevidence

Accepted Articleinanattempttodi?erentiatebetweenthesealternativestories.

A.Hypotheses

A.1.

CareerConcernsHypothesis

The?rsthypothesisisbasedonavariationofthecareerconcernstheory(Holmstrom

(1982)).Underthishypothesis,theprincipal-agentproblemoccursbetweenshareholdersandthemanager.Themanagergainsprivatebene?tsfromretainingherjob.Innovationmaycostthemanagerherjob,however,ifshareholdersattributeinnovationfailures,eventhoseduetopurelystochasticreasons,topoormanagerialskill.Asaresult,concernsabouttheimpactofinnovationoninvestors’perceptionofthemanager’sability,thatis,careerconcerns,leadtoanaversiontoinnovation.

Increasedmonitoringmayallowinvestorstodistinguishbetweenunluckynegativedraws

27

This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

andmanagerialskill(Aghion,VanReenen,andZingales(2013)),whichwouldhelpinsulatethemanagerfromadversereputationalconsequencesofinnovation.Inprivate?rms,whereownershipisconcentrated,investorshavegreaterincentivetomo …… 此处隐藏：6388字，全部文档内容请下载后查看。喜欢就下载吧 ……