浅谈我国股东代表诉讼制度

股东代表诉讼制度是公司法上一项重要的监督机制,为保护中小股东的利益提供了有效的法律保护。自十九世纪中期该制度在英国创设以来,在美国等英美法系国家得到了迅速的发展,并不断被大陆法系国家所吸纳。

浅谈我国股东代表诉讼制度

中文

股东代表诉讼制度是公司法上一项重要的监督机制，为保护中小股东的利益提供了有效的法律保护。自十九世纪中期该制度在英国创设以来，在美国等英美法系国家得到了迅速的发展，并不断被大陆法系国家所吸纳。我国于2005年新修订的公司法中明确确立此制度，但规定过于原则，实践中缺乏可操作性，需要从各方面进行完善，以促进我国现代公司制度的发展。本文从股东代表诉讼的基本理论入手，通过对有关国家司法和实践经验的总结，论证了股东代表诉讼的诉权基础、当事人理论、制约机制、激励机制，重点说明我国该如何进一步完善该制度。本文从实体法和程序法两方面对股东代表诉讼的各个方面进行分析，运用比较分析法、历史分析法、实证分析法等分析方法，深入研究，试图提出一些完善我国股东代表诉讼制度的浅见。本文除引言、结语共四部分：第一部分是股东代表诉讼概述。阐述了股东代表诉讼的概念、历史演进及与相关制度的区别，重点阐述了股东代表诉讼的诉权来源在法律上的理论依据。第二论文部分是股东代表诉讼的当事人及诉讼范围。结合美国、日本立法的相关规定，阐述了原告资格的确定，被告的主体和实施范围以及公司和其他股东在诉讼中的地位，并对我国公司法中的相关规定做出分析、提出完善建议。第三、第四部分分别对股东代表诉讼的制约机制和激励机制进行了论述。主要通过对美国、日本公司法的比较研究，阐述了前置程序制度、诉讼费用担保制度、原告股东败诉的赔偿责任、原告股东诉讼费用补偿制度、比例性个别赔偿请求权制度、诉讼受理费用的优惠制度，并通过对这些制度的分析，提出了我国公司法关于这些制度的立法完善建议。

译文

Shareholder’s representative action is an important supervisory mechanism in the law of corporation, provides effective legal protection for medium and small shareholders. When the system was set up in Britain in the middle of 19 century, it was immediately developed by many countries of Civil law system and constantly absorbed by countries of http:// civil law system. In china, the revised “company law” clearly established this system. However the new company law just provided some principles, lack of operability. It needs many aspects of improvement, in order to promote the development of our modern corporate system. This paper starts from the basic theory of Shareholder’s representative action. By the summary of national judicial and practical experience, it demonstrates the basis of the shareholders’ rights, the parties theory, the restriction mechanism, incentive mechanism, and highlights how to further improve the system in china. Form both substantive and procedural law ,it analysis various aspects of the shareholder’s representative action using comparative analysis, historical analysis, empirical

股东代表诉讼制度是公司法上一项重要的监督机制,为保护中小股东的利益提供了有效的法律保护。自十九世纪中期该制度在英国创设以来,在美国等英美法系国家得到了迅速的发展,并不断被大陆法系国家所吸纳。

analysis and other analytical methods, trying to give my some opinion to perfect the Shareholder’s derivative action. Addition to the introduction and the conclusion, this paper has four parts. The first part is an overview of the shareholder’s representative action. It starts from the concept, historic development and the difference form related system, focusing on the theoretical basis of the source of the right. The second part is parties theory and litigation range of this system. Combining with the related system in the United States and Japan, it discuss the qualification of the plaintiffs, the scope of the defendants as well as the position of company and other shareholders in the proceedings and then it analysis the relevant provisions of the Law in China to put forward a sound proposal. In the third and fourth part, the restriction mechanism and incentive mechanism of this system are discussed. Two parts state the previous procedure system, lawsuit fee guaranty system, compensation obligation of failed shareholders, fee compensation system, racial inpidual compensation system and the cost of the preferential system, by a comparative study of the law of the United States and Japan. At last, the thesis put forward suggestions for improving this system in China.